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ChURCh AND StAtE IN SOlOMON ISlANDS
INtRODUCtION
Religion is a major part of Melanesian 
culture, especially in contrast with Western 
culture where an ethos of secularism 
and separation of religion from state is 
increasingly seen as normative. However, 
Western governments and nations such as 
Australia are now once again involved in 
Melanesia in way that could be characterised 
as “neo-colonial”, some twenty to thirty years 
after relinquishing colonial responsibility for 
countries such as Papua New Guinea. The 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) in particular involves 
Australia and New Zealand in intervention 
in the Solomon Islands, which after the 
ethnic tensions of 1998-2003 came to be 
categorised as a “failing state.” Inevitably 
they bring into this environment the political 
and social philosophies and understandings 
of their own culture, and at times these 
are in significant variance from Melanesian 
culture.
Whilst one should be cautious in 
generalising about Melanesian culture, 
which is as varied as European or Asian 
cultures, there are some generalisations 
that can be usefully made to guide thinking. 
One of these is that spiritual and religious 
aspects of life are far more obvious in 
the daily life of Melanesians than they are 
for Westerners. Additionally, it could be 
argued that in the Solomon Islands the only 
national institutions that command a loyalty 
and respect that transcend provincial and 
tribal boundaries are the churches and other 
organisations in civil society, and possibly 
the Solomon Islands Football Federation 
(SIFF – the national game is soccer). As a 
generalization, the churches command much 
more respect than government (White 2006, 
6). The Western separation of religion and 
daily life, and subsequently the separation 
of Church and State, are not features of 
Melanesian culture. In the experience of the 
authors, whilst many academics and officials 
are aware of this (for example, the discussion 
by Nelson 2006, of the churches as an 
“alternate state”) others seem oblivious. For 
example the then Australian Deputy High 
Commission, Anita Butler, at the workshop 
Solomon Islands: Where to now? (Australian 
National University, 5th May 2006) made 
no references to the churches or religion 
in her discussion (admittedly brief) of the 
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Therefore in this paper the relationship 
of Church and State in the Solomon Islands 
will be discussed, both historically, in the 
present context, and with a view to future 
involvement of the churches in governance. 
The role and position of the Anglican Church 
of Melanesia (ACOM) of which both authors 
are ministers is especially relevant as it is the 
largest church in the Solomon Islands, and is 
the majority denomination in Isabel, Central 
and Temotu Provinces, with substantial 
minorities in the other provinces. Therefore 
observations about the Anglican Church, 
even where they are not applicable to other 
denominations, nevertheless have a broad 
application in Solomon Islands.
hIStORICAl BACKGROUND
Often there is a tendency to think that 
formal colonisation was the first step in 
the process of Western Imperialism in the 
nineteenth century, followed by missionaries 
called in to support the imperial power. In 
Melanesia, as elsewhere, this is not the 
case. Formal annexation of the islands of 
Melanesia was the last step, and occurred 
well after missionary activity started in the 
islands. The Solomon Islands is a case 
in point: by the end of the 1880’s large 
parts of the Solomons (such as Isabel and 
Gela) had largely been converted to Anglican 
Christianity, and the Anglicans and other 
missions were active in most of the other 
island groups of the Solomon Islands.
Before the establishment of the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP) in 
1893 a power vacuum existed, as Christian 
conversions undermined the previous 
political structures. Warfare between tribes 
and clans was no longer an acceptable way 
of maintaining order, and in any event with 
the advent of firearms had become a far more 
dangerous practice. For the protection of their 
converts, the missions started to engage in 
forms of political governance. For example, 
there were moves to establish a “Parliament” 
on Nggela with the encouragement and 
superintendence of the Melanesian Mission 
in 1888 (White 1991, 184). The role of 
this “parliament” was to provide for some 
form of governance in the absence of any 
formal state, but it was a mixed success and 
the establishment of the Protectorate was 
generally welcomed by the missions.
After the establishment of the Protectorate 
the missions generally cooperated with the 
BSIP administration and supported British 
rule (Hilliard 1978, 239), but there was 
also often some tension: the first Resident 
Commissioner (Charles Morris Woodford) 
was “wary of the activities of the Melanesian 
Mission” (Heath 1978, 202). At times this 
surfaced as competition for power. For 
example, through the Anglican Bishop of 
Melanesia the Catechists (village religious 
leaders) on Isabel complained about 
usurpation of the role of the Chiefs in 1921 
(White 1991, 188), and the 1930’s saw 
even greater competition. In 1929 the Revd 
Richard Fallowes was appointed as District 
Priest for Isabel. He appointed “Church 
Chiefs” for each village, who were soon 
at loggerheads with government appointed 
headmen. Lonsdale Gado was appointed 
as Paramount Chief by Fallowes for Isabel. 
Geoffrey White described the situation thus 
(White 1991, 191):
Gado became the church counterpart of 
the senior government headman Walter 
Notere. Given the rather unique situation 
in Santa Isabel of one church (Anglican) 
and one government for the entire island, 
the status of Gado and Notere constituted 
comparable positions of island-wide 
leadership, representing the separate but 
parallel institutions of church and state. 
Furthermore, each of these positions was 
linked to parallel (and at times intersecting) 
networks of village-level leaders (church 
chiefs and headmen).
Before World War II the “Chair and Rule” 
movement guided by Fallowes (modelled on 
the 1880’s experimental “parliament” on Gela) 
caused tension for the BSIP Government, 
as it articulated the grievances of Solomon 
Islanders against the fairly haphazard British 
administration. The government eventually 
dealt with the problem by deporting Richard 
Fallowes.
The Pacific War had a great impact on 
the Solomons, and after the war Ma’asina 
Ruru (also known as the “Marching Rule” 
movement) arose, initially in Malaita, where 
it challenged British rule (Whiteman 1983, 
250ff). Ma’asina Ruru was most active among 
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South Sea Evangelical Church adherents, 
whose expatriate leadership had fled before 
the Japanese invasion and therefore had less 
influence amongst its adherents (Whiteman 
1983, 267-273). In contrast the Anglican 
Bishop and his staff had stayed in the 
islands with the British administration during 
the war, and exercised more control; the 
veteran Anglican missionary the Revd Dr. 
Charles Elliot Fox successfully prevented 
the spread of Ma’asina Ruru to Gela. These 
experiences increased the identification of 
the Anglican Melanesian Mission with the 
British administration.
However, this identification with the 
administration lessened during the twilight 
of colonial rule. The Anglican Church 
became increasingly indigenised and gained 
ecclesiastical independence from the Anglican 
Church of New Zealand in 1975, electing 
the first Melanesian Archbishop that same 
year (Whiteman 1983, 298-301). Today there 
are over 500 stipendiary clergy, with only 
three expatriates in active ministry. Similar 
developments took place in the Protestant 
denominations, though the Roman Catholic 
Church remains more tightly tied to overseas 
governance.
Importantly, the Churches began to hand 
over their education and health services 
to the colonial government. Previously the 
BSIP government had been content to leave 
education and health to the missions; but 
with increasing intervention in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, accompanied by an ideology in 
Britain at the time which stressed the role of 
government in providing these services the 
BSIP administration took a greater interest 
in these areas. Consequently in the 1970’s 
most of these services were handed over to 
the government; all Anglican schools with the 
exception of Selwyn College were transferred 
to the newly formed government Department 
of Education in 1975 (BSIP Government 
1976a, 69, 118). As the colonial period 
came to an end, the departing British in 
consultation with a Constitutional Committee 
dominated by local politicians instituted a 
Westminster style of government, based 
on a report by a Constitutional Committee 
consisting of leading Solomon Islanders 
(BSIP Government 1976b).2  The resulting 
constitution reflects the thinking of the 
Constitutional Committee and follows the 
model of Western, secular constitutions, 
with only one passing reference to God in 
the preamble. The only other references 
to religion in the Constitution are found in 
Section 11, which is concerned with human 
rights such as freedom of conscience, but 
also permits the Churches to operate schools 
as long as they do not enforce religious 
observance.
thE POSt-COlONIAl ERA
The formal structure of the new nation 
of the Solomon Islands, which was granted 
independence by the United Kingdom in 
1978, was of a western style Westminster 
democracy. Since then it has been said that 
Solomon Island politicians have done little 
more than “tinker” with the political structures 
bequeathed by the British (Moore 2004, 90). 
However, whilst the formal structures are 
little changed, the relationship of Church 
and State has evolved, reflecting underlying 
culture rather than the imposed colonial 
structure.
In the period from 1978 to 1998 the 
churches tended not to be involved in politics, 
though individual pastors and priests often 
took elected office. However, there were two 
important developments. The first was that the 
churches ventured back into education: there 
was a clear feeling that leaving education to 
the secular authorities was not necessarily 
in the best interests of the churches, and 
that in terms of raising young people with 
a religious world view it was best if the 
churches ran their own schools (Zaku 2006, 
75), albeit using a standard government 
approved curriculum. This has extended into 
significant involvement in the technical and 
tertiary education sector.
The second development was the 
formation of the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association (SICA). As the churches matured 
and moved towards independence they also 
moved away from their traditional rivalry 
towards a more co-operative stance. SICA 
was formed in July 1967 (Bird 2007, 7), and 
is principally comprised of the five largest 
denominations in the Solomon Islands. At the 
1999 Census (Solomon Islands Government 
2000, Table B3.05, 158ff) the Anglican Church 
of Melanesia (then COM, now ACOM) was 
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counted as 33% of the population; the Catholic 
Church (19%); the South Seas Evangelical 
Church (SSEC) (17%); the United Church 
of the Solomon Islands (UCSI – formerly the 
Methodist Mission) (11%); and the Seventh-
Day Adventists (SDA) (11%). The Churches 
have different historical origins – the Anglican 
Church is very much “high church” in character, 
stressing the sacraments and the role of the 
Priesthood in a similar way to the Catholic 
Church, and therefore contrasts with more 
protestant churches such as the UCSI, SSEC 
and SDA churches. The denominations also 
have different geographical concentrations 
– ACOM is dominant in Isabel, Central 
Province and Temotu with large populations 
in Malaita, Makira and Guadalcanal, whereas 
the UCSI is largely based in the west of the 
Solomon Islands. However, through SICA 
they work together with considerable effect 
on a number of issues, although in the 
experience of the authors the SDA are the 
least enthusiastic members of SICA, having 
a history of strained relationships with the 
other churches. In general SICA and the 
churches tend to steer clear of overt political 
involvement.
However, it is not unusual for ordained 
ministers to be involved in politics. For 
example, one of the authors of this paper was 
both an Anglican Priest, and a minister in the 
government of Solomon Mamaloni from 1995 
to 1998. Whilst there is the odd individual 
in Australian politics who is an ordained 
minister, it is a little unusual and Australian 
politicians tend not to proclaim their religious 
convictions openly. However, in the Solomon 
Islands much of the political campaigning 
and machinations has a religious face, and 
politicians liberally invoke God and the Bible 
in support of their ambitions.
However, this is not the most significant 
aspect of the involvement of religion in the 
affairs of state in the Solomon Islands. Even 
in Western secular democracies religion is 
an element of politics, especially in the 
United States where the Christian right has 
significant political influence. Rather, it is 
the involvement of the Church at the “grass 
roots” or when governance fails, which gives 
the Churches a special role in the Solomon 
Islands and elsewhere in Melanesia.
One of the authors, Fr Charles Brown 
Beu, has been active in politics at all levels, 
especially in his home province of Temotu. 
The history of Temotu and the Anglican 
Church (which is the dominant church in the 
province) is intertwined: it was at Nukapu 
Island at the north of the Reef Islands that 
Bishop John Coleridge Patteson, first Bishop 
of Melanesia, was martyred in 1871 along 
with Joseph Atkins and Stephen Taroaniara. 
After being resistant to the Christian message, 
by World War II the islands of Temotu were 
largely Christianised, and specifically adopted 
an Anglo-Catholic or high church form of 
Anglicanism. This was important because 
of the emphasis in Anglo-Catholicism on 
the role of the priest. Before Christianity, the 
priest was a central figure in society, who 
could call on the spirits for healing, changing 
of weather patterns, and predicting the future. 
There was therefore a close relationship 
between the priests and the chiefs, and often 
the priests possessed more power than 
the chiefs, being the intermediary between 
the chiefs and the spiritual powers. Priests 
possessed mana (power) and this was power 
both in a religious and political sense.
With the advent of Anglican Christianity 
there has been a transfer of allegiance from 
the traditional priests to the Christian priest, 
and regardless of the finer points of Christian 
theology, the priest continues to have mana 
and an intermediary role between the people 
and God. Both authors in their role as priests 
have been called upon (as a matter of pastoral 
routine) to conduct healings and clearances 
(also known as exorcisms), both of which 
involve the exercise of mana. Related to this, 
in most communities the people give most of 
their trust and respect to the priest, and then 
to the chiefs, and behind them comes the 
politicians and government officials.
In addition to the direct exercise of religious 
functions, whenever there is a social or 
political problem in the village the council of 
chiefs would call the author (Brown Beu) for 
advice regarding the religious side of things 
before they take a decision. On the same 
note, whenever there is a political or social 
reconciliation the programme begins with a 
church service, usually the celebration of the 
Holy Eucharist. This would be followed by 
appropriate speeches by the chiefs and the 
priest, giving and receiving of compensation, 
exchange of gifts, and feasting and dancing. 
Typical of this pattern was a reconciliation 
ceremony involving the author (Brown Beu) 
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and his successor as Member of Parliament, 
Patteson Oti. The reconciliation was 
necessitated by intemperate and defamatory 
language used against Beu by Oti’s campaign 
manager some years previous. The ceremony 
attracted nearly five thousand people and cost 
over twenty thousand Solomon dollars. Fr 
Brown Beu did not request the reconciliation 
ceremony – rather Patteson Oti did, as he 
attributed a number of misfortunes he had 
suffered to having wronged a priest. 
This example shows the interaction of 
politics and religion, especially at the local 
level where there is much interaction between 
chiefs and priests. However, this interaction 
extends upwards. Priests are in a position 
of power at the local level, and that often 
extends into leadership at the political level. 
In 1991 Fr Brown Beu was elected into the 
national Parliament at a by-election after his 
predecessor was imprisoned for misconduct 
in office. He was then principal of a Rural 
Training Centre, and sought (and received) 
the blessing of his Bishop for this foray into 
politics. Later he became a cabinet minister 
in the government of Solomon Mamaloni, 
before leaving politics to resume a religious 
vocation in 1998. Other Temotuan priests 
have also achieved high office, particularly 
Fr (Sir) John Ini Lapli, who was Governor-
General from 1999 to 2004.
This tradition of involvement of the Church 
at village level politics continues to this day: 
a custom that has arisen is Paramount chiefs 
where appointed in the Solomon Islands 
are usually blessed and inaugurated by 
the relevant Church; and often Paramount 
Chiefs hold important ecclesiastical office. 
For example Bishop Sir Dudley Tuti, one of 
the first indigenous Bishops in Melanesia 
and first Bishop of Ysabel following the 
independence of the Church of Melanesia, 
was installed as Paramount Chief of Isabel in 
1975 (White 1991, 209ff). Indeed, this tradition 
continues – for example, the first part of the 
recent consecration of the new Anglican 
Bishop of Hanuato’o (which is coterminous 
with the province of Makira-Ulawa) included 
his installation as a Paramount Chief. This 
is more than just symbolic: the Bishop of 
the Central Solomons was reported in the 
Solomon Star newspaper (‘Anglican Clerics 
step up anti-logging battle’, 12 Dec 2005) as 
using his status as a Paramount Chief to help 
justify his ban on logging on Gela. In Isabel, 
Tripod Governance (comprising the Tripod of 
Provincial Government, the Anglican Diocese 
of Ysabel and the Isabel Council of Chiefs) 
has been formalised by a Memorandum of 
Understanding (White 2006, 16), and claims 
precedents going back to 1885 before the 
declaration of the Protectorate.
thE ChURChES IN thE EthNIC 
tENSION 1998-2003
The involvement of the churches in 
secular activities in the post-colonial period 
perhaps became most apparent during the 
ethnic tension of 1998 to 2003 when the 
State started to break down and was unable 
to deliver even essential services such as 
law and order, education and health. At the 
start of the tension the churches did not 
become involved, seeing the deteriorating 
security situation as a matter for the national 
government. Initial responses by the churches 
to the crisis were dilatory and ineffective, and 
the “prophetic voice” which could have been 
used to condemn poor leaders who claimed 
to be good Christians was not heard (Zaku 
2006, 66ff). Arguably, the churches still held 
to the late-colonial view that Church and 
State were separate spheres, and that it was 
not the role of the Church to become involved 
in the developing crisis of state authority.
However, inevitably the churches were 
pulled into the crisis. It was soon clear 
that the most effective delivers of essential 
services, especially education and to a lesser 
extent health, were the churches. This was 
a reversion to a previous method of church 
activity from the missionary period. The 
Anglican Church was never strong in the 
provision of health services, but had always 
a big interest in education, and one of the 
best schools in the country is Selwyn College 
in north-west Guadalcanal. In comparison, 
the Seventh Day Adventists had a long 
history of involvement in health care and 
run an excellent hospital at Atoifi in Malaita. 
The services offered by the churches had 
been expanding since the handing over to 
Government of most of their public service 
facilities in the mid-1970s, and the churches 
now have extensive involvement in both 
secondary and tertiary education. During 
the tension, church controlled institutions 
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continued to be resourced and staff 
continued to be paid. Accordingly, there 
was continuous and effective provision of 
services by the churches.3  In comparison, 
Government institutions such as schools, 
colleges and hospitals were badly affected 
through starvation of resources and non-
payment of salary and fees by Government, 
resulting in strikes by staff and suspension of 
services (Moore 2004, 182).4
However, there was also more overt 
involvement in public affairs during the 
tension. The ordained clergy were often 
negotiators for peace and reconciliation, at 
all levels down to the village and family level. 
In the Anglican Church, both the Archbishop 
of Melanesia, Sir Ellison Pogo (from Isabel), 
and the Bishop of Malaita, Terry Brown 
(from Canada) were involved in facilitating 
negotiations between militant leaders and 
politicians, and in organising conferences and 
meetings such as the important workshop 
held at Dala Village in central Malaita in 2001 
(Zaku 2006, 82). In particular, the Archbishop 
was involved in negotiations on behalf of both 
ACOM and the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association.
Perhaps the most visible involvement 
of senior clergy was in the more overt 
involvement of SICA and the churches in 
politics, in a way they had not been involved in 
the post-colonial period. A significant example 
of this politicisation was the opposition of 
SICA to the proposal by Prime Minister 
Sogavare to delay the elections due in late 
2001, which resulted in Sogavare bitterly 
attacking SICA. But in the end, Sogavare 
was forced to back down and elections 
proceeded as scheduled (Fraenkel 2004, 
130). SICA (and its constituent churches) 
continued to be involved as a significant civil 
society group as a party in political processes 
and in peacemaking and reconciliation efforts 
throughout the tension (Moore 2004, 152-
153).
Whilst the average Solomon Islander may 
not have been overly aware of the work of 
the senior clergy, they were certainly aware 
of the work of the religious orders, especially 
the Melanesian Brothers who are part of the 
Anglican Church. The Melanesian Brothers 
are an indigenous religious order founded 
in 1925 by Ini Kopuria, an ex-policeman 
from Guadalcanal, and whilst Brothers are 
committed to the three traditional promises 
of obedience, celibacy and poverty unlike 
the European model they do not take life 
vows. Typically, a Brother serves as a novice 
(trainee) for three to four years, and then 
three to seven years as a Brother before 
being released to return to a secular life. As 
a result the average Brother (known in Pijin 
as a Tasiu) is relatively young and fit, and 
it has proved a very successful movement, 
with about 400 Tasiu and novices currently 
serving in the Solomon Islands, PNG and 
Vanuatu, with most in Solomon Islands. The 
Brothers in their uniform of black and white 
are familiar figures in Solomon Islands, and 
often credited with mana (spiritual power). 
After release from the Brotherhood they 
usually go on to marriage and a leadership 
role in the village; many go onto secular or 
religious leadership roles at a higher level.
The Tasiu played a significant role during 
the tension in roles as diverse as rescuing 
hostages, disarmament, and delivery of food 
and supplies. The Anglican and Catholic 
sisters were also involved in this humanitarian 
work, and the religious orders and clergy 
were often the only people whose vehicles 
were allowed to cross unhindered between 
MEF and IFM positions outside Honiara. 
Indeed, the Tasiu camped in no-man’s land, 
both in a literal and more figurative sense 
(Zaku 2006, 96),5  and were often used as 
mediators. People turned to the Tasiu for 
protection (Zaku 2006, 100) and they risked 
their lives in their humanitarian work and 
mediation between the MEF and IFM (Moore 
2004, 152). They were also involved in the 
rescue of prison officers isolated at Tetere in 
north-east Guadalcanal, and the rescue of 
Malaitans in north-west Guadalcanal.
Perhaps the most understated but 
significant contribution of the Clergy and 
Religious Orders, especially the Tasiu, was 
in the disarmament process. Such success 
as the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) 
achieved in disarmament is arguably largely 
due to the Brothers. In early 2001 an 
Anglican priest and a team of Brothers were 
assigned to the Peace Monitoring Council 
(PMC) set up in accordance with the TPA 
(Zaku 2004, 103). They claim that they 
were more successful than the International 
Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) in collecting 
weapons (Carter 2006, 74-75).
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However, there were tensions between 
the religious orders and the militant groups. 
For example, the Melanesian Brothers were 
involved in confrontation with individual 
militants: Richard Carter (at that time Chaplain 
of the Melanesian Brotherhood) gives an 
account of a heated discussion in 2002 with 
key MEF leader Leslie Kwaiga over the issue 
of disarmament of militants (Carter 2006, 
80-83). In bringing the message of peace the 
Brothers came to be at risk: it was on one such 
mission to Harold Keke on the Weathercoast 
in early 2003 that Brother Nathaniel Sado 
lost his life. Another six Brothers who then 
journeyed to the Weathercoast to recover 
the body were also tortured and murdered by 
men under Keke’s command in April 2003, in 
one of the last atrocities of the tension.6
The humanitarian and peacekeeping role 
of the clergy and Religious Orders, especially 
the Melanesian Brothers, was probably the 
most high profile aspect of the involvement 
of the churches in more secular affairs during 
the tension. The role of the laity (especially 
women), both in support of the clergy and 
Religious Orders and as church communities 
and individuals motivated by ideals of 
Christian love, can be overlooked: but the 
laity also played a significant role (Zaku 
2006, 104-108). In particular, significant local 
peacemaking and reconciliation was carried 
out by all the churches (Bird 2007, 12).
However, the churches also suffered. 
Individual clergy and religious order members 
were intimidated or kidnapped (Moore 
2004, 152) or assaulted by militants (Carter 
2006, 88-89) with MEF and IFM members 
responsible for intimidation and assaults. 
The IFM went further, with the murder in 
2002 by Harold Keke of Fr Augustine Geve, 
a Catholic Priest who had become a Member 
of Parliament and Cabinet Minister. This 
was followed by kidnapping of one group 
of Melanesian Brothers in 2003, and the 
murder of another group by Keke’s military 
commander, Ronnie Cawa. The churches 
joined in the general acclamation of the 
intervention by RAMSI in 2003, and stepped 
back from direct involvement in the political 
process, with RAMSI taking responsibility 
for restoring law and order and enforcing 
disarmament. The churches were able to 
return to more comfortable ground, both 
theologically and politically, where they were 
disengaged from the direct political process
Following the April 2006 riots the churches 
became re-engaged for a short period in the 
political process. There was limited use of 
Melanesian Brothers as unarmed security 
guards, including a short stint at the Honiara 
Hotel, which harked back to a role they had 
in the tension when they guarded key points 
(such as the Governor-General’s residence) 
in the absence of effective policing. However, 
more important was the relationship with the 
government led by Manasseh Sogavare that 
came to power after the riots.
One the one hand, Sogavare tried to enlist 
the support of the Churches; one attempt 
at doing this was “tithing” by Government. 
Tithing is a practice going back to Old 
Testament times (for example, the regulations 
in the Bible, in Numbers Chapter 18 or 
Deuteronomy Chapter 14), and it became 
the practice in many Christian churches 
(including those in the Solomon Islands) for 
believers to “tithe” or give one-tenth of their 
income to the church. Sogavare declared 
that the Government would also “tithe” its 
income, giving ten percent of its surplus to 
the Churches. Whilst this measure raised 
eyebrows among outside observers, it was 
not such an amazing concept to Solomon 
Islanders. This money was distributed 
through the Members of Parliaments to 
their constituencies; in the experience of the 
authors it would seem that the amount given 
to churches at the village level seems to have 
been about SBD $2,500 for a year, though 
this amount varies considerably based on 
the number of persons in the village or 
parish, and other factors known only to the 
Honourable Member concerned.
The mainstream churches which form 
SICA have been lukewarm about tithing, 
but some of the smaller new fundamentalist 
churches have been keen on the idea. SICA 
is wary of the concept because of its potential 
for corrupting the churches, by making 
them dependent on Government funding. 
In practice, the two largest denominations 
(the Anglicans and Catholics) and also 
the Seventh-Day Adventists have reliable 
overseas sources of finance, and therefore 
are not as likely to become dependent on 
tithing by Government as other less-well 
resourced churches might. However the 
potential corruption remains, as local pastors 
and ministers take on responsibility for the 
use and distribution of these funds.
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In practice, in spite of tithing, SICA had 
become a vocal critic of much that the 
Sogavare government was doing, which 
harks back a little to its role at the time 
of the previous Sogavare government. For 
example, it opposed the rearmament of the 
Solomon Islands Police (Bird 2007, 8), and 
the appointment of Julian Moti as Attorney-
General, and was critical in other ways of the 
government leading to a fairly bitter attack 
on SICA by Sogavare, with the Solomon 
Islands Government issuing a press release 
on 20 November 2007 titled ‘PM Sogavare 
Calls On SICA To Stay Out Off Politics’ [sic].7 
With the fall of the Sogavare government 
in December 2007 and its replacement by 
a government led by Dr Derek Sikua (an 
Anglican from north-east Guadalcanal, and 
known to the authors through church links) 
there has been a lessening of the tension 
between SICA and the Government, and 
the churches have once again stepped back 
from open political involvement.
However, Governments in the Solomon 
Islands are fragile, and as the second 
Sogavare government showed, the former 
militants and associated power brokers are 
far from spent. Political instability is still a 
possibility (perhaps even a probability) in 
the Solomon Islands. Therefore SICA and 
the churches remain key players. Therefore 
we must consider possible models of future 
involvement of the Churches in politics and 
government in the Solomon Islands.
ChURCh, StAtE AND ExtERNAl 
AGENCIES
The churches are very important at the 
“grass roots” level in the villages, where the 
vast majority of Solomon Islanders still live8, 
and from where nearly all Solomon Islanders 
obtain their sense of identity and place. This 
accounts partly for the strength of religion in 
Solomon Island and Melanesian life – religion 
is not just a matter of spirituality, but also 
central to personal and communal identity. 
Additionally, of course, the power structures 
in the village level are usually also located in 
the organisational structures of the Church – 
the “big men” at the village level are usually 
also identified with the Church as Elders, or 
senior members of vestry committees, or 
Catechists or clergy.
At the national level, the churches are 
important political players, and as discussed 
have acted to frustrate or hinder Government 
policies. Likewise the general support of 
the churches for RAMSI has, at the least, 
been helpful for RAMSI in establishing and 
maintaining its legitimacy and popularity with 
the general population.
We should not overestimate the political 
strength of the churches – it is doubtful that 
they are in a position to impose policy or 
dictate terms to government. Corruption, 
which is hardly a Christian virtue, continues to 
be a key factor in governance. Furthermore, 
the churches have no desire to impose a 
“theocracy” on the Solomon Islands, and do 
not have the unity or strength to do so. Unlike 
Fiji and some other Pacific countries, there 
is no one denomination that commands the 
allegiance of the majority of Christians. On 
the other hand, they do have the strength, 
and on occasions the will, to successfully 
resist or oppose Government, and have a 
long history of doing so back to the early 
days of the Protectorate.
It is important to understand the nuances of 
the religious values that underpin Melanesian 
Christianity. The theological approach 
described here is particularly Anglican, but 
would also be shared in general with the 
other major denominations, especially the 
Catholics and the UCSI. Religion should not 
be seen as “other-worldly”. The Kingdom 
of God proclaimed by Jesus was not just a 
Kingdom in Heaven, but also a Kingdom to 
be brought into the present world through 
teaching and healing and sharing. Most 
Westerners are exposed to American-
style evangelism, in which Christianity is 
understood as being primarily a matter of 
individual conversion, or “accepting Jesus as 
your personal saviour”. This is not the case 
with Anglican or other mainline Christian 
churches in Solomon Islands. Christianity is 
vitally concerned with community. Therefore 
Christianity should be practiced corporately 
and as a community, and Christian values 
are not to be privatised but shared in the 
community. Accordingly the churches will 
take an interest in more worldly matters, 
and actively be involved in areas such as 
health care and education. On the other 
hand, they do not want to be government: 
the churches are not called upon to rule the 
world. Theocracy is a mistake. Unlike other 
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Pacific countries (such as Fiji) the churches 
as organised bodies tend to shy away from 
overt political involvement if possible, but will 
become involved if they see it as important to 
their mission of bringing peace and healing 
or for preventing gross injustice.
One question therefore that arises is 
the future relationship of Government to 
the churches. The churches will not want to 
govern, or be cast in the role of Opposition. 
However, the churches will continue to 
be involved in the provision of services, 
and will continue to expand in that sphere. 
For example, both the Anglican and SDA 
churches have advanced plans, with the 
moral and promised financial support of the 
government, for the building of universities 
in or near Honiara, which will further their 
involvement in tertiary education.
Such involvement in provision of services 
will inevitably bring the churches into 
sustained contact, and even partnership, not 
only with government but also with aid donors 
and external agencies. Donor partners have 
recognised that the churches are an effective 
deliverer of services, and are increasingly 
involved in partnership arrangements. There 
are now many buildings in Solomon Islands 
that have been built largely by funding from 
donors such as AusAID and the EU which 
are run and operated by the churches. These 
include schools, hospitals, and even rest 
houses. For example, there is a particularly 
fine rest house at Tulagi operated by the 
Mothers Union of the Anglican Church, which 
was built largely with AusAID funds. Indeed, 
the last time Dr Joseph visited Tulagi in 2005 
the AusAID sign was very prominent on the 
front of the building.
This involvement does give rise to 
interesting ethical issues. In general, aid 
donors are representatives of secular 
governments and institutions, and therefore 
steer clear of overt religious involvement. 
However, by channeling support through the 
churches and church leaders, they inevitably 
give support to religious organisations. Whilst 
the aid donors (quite rightly) will not fund 
church buildings, the buildings and projects 
they do fund often do work to the support of 
churches. For example, the Mothers Union 
rest house at Tulagi discussed above is 
operated by the Mothers Union, and any 
profits will go to the Mothers Union, and be 
used for a variety of purposes, some of which 
are clearly religious. If a donor provides 
funding for a school house in a village, it will 
probably be used for religious education as 
well as secular education; indeed, it may 
even be used as a church building on some 
occasions. Clearly donor partnership with 
churches will involve activities which support 
the churches, even if only because there is 
no clear distinction between religious and 
secular activities. Assistance in the secular 
field (especially at the local level) inevitably 
will be channeled by the local community into 
a number of activities on which local identity 
is based, and which will include religious 
activities.
One area in which external agencies 
have become involved is reconciliation and 
the restoration of peace (Bird 2007, 11ff). 
Clearly in this type of area the churches are 
motivated by their basic values and mission, 
and use those values in order to promote 
reconciliation and peace. External agencies 
becoming involved in supporting this type of 
work are of necessity involved in supporting, 
at the least, the use of those religious values 
in support of peace and reconciliation.
Clearly the churches are seen as being 
effective deliverers of services, and hence 
external agencies that may usually have 
reservations about supporting churches are 
willing to support them in spite of any qualms 
over the above issues. It also points out that 
for the foreseeable future one of the major 
roles of the churches, at least in the eyes of 
external agencies, is the delivery of public 
sector services, and in healing some of the 
wounds related to the tension. In these areas 
the churches can be seen as having a better 
capacity than government, or at the least 
a capacity that effectively supplements the 
work of government.
This foreshadows another issue – “what 
if” effective government collapses? The 
Solomon Islands came close to this during 
the ethnic tension, and in the absence of 
RAMSI would certainly tend to anarchy. 
Arguably Papua New Guinea faces similar 
problems of possible disintegration. In 
the absence of effective governance, the 
churches may fill the vacuum, and move 
from the delivery of services to the delivery 
of government. There are certainly historical 
precedents for this, in the pre-colonial period. 
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However, as discussed above the churches 
certainly do not see themselves in the role 
of an “alternative government”, and are ill-
prepared for this role. It is simply not part of 
the mission of the church. It is one thing to 
deliver services such as education or health 
in the absence of government, or even to 
conduct disarmament missions and peace 
and reconciliation missions when government 
is failing. But it is quite another matter to 
assume government, and not something that 
the churches would contemplate or want to 
undertake.
CONClUSION
The late colonial paradigm of separation of 
Church and State which was imposed on 
the emerging nations of Melanesia has not 
reflected reality. Both culture and history show 
that religion and government are intertwined. 
The greater effectiveness of the churches 
in delivering both identity and services to 
the people is reflected in the confidence 
and authority that the people give to the 
churches, but do not give to government.
External agencies need to be aware of 
this, and should not approach governance 
in Solomon Islands with the preconception 
that church and state can be separated. 
Additionally, those seeking to aid or intervene 
in Melanesia need to understand the religious 
value system that underlies public discourse 
and be aware that involvement with the 
churches will also involve them, willing or 
otherwise, in the religious value systems 
of those churches. Otherwise, they will be 
limited in their effectiveness in delivering 
their message and services to the people of 
Melanesia, or in reforming the institutions of 
government. In particular, for the foreseeable 
future, external agencies will find that the 
churches are effective organisations in 
the delivery of all sorts of services that 
would normally be considered the primary 
responsibility of government.
AUthOR NOtES
Both authors are Anglican Priests, working at 
the Bishop Patteson Theological College on 
Guadalcanal, which is the major seminary of 
the Anglican Church of Melanesia (ACOM). 
However, the views expressed in this paper 
should not be taken as representing the 
position of ACOM.
The Revd Dr Keith Joseph is an Australian, 
who completed his PhD in Philosophy at 
the University of Newcastle (NSW). Prior 
to ordination in the Solomon Islands, he 
was at various times a university lecturer in 
Australia, a Major in the Australian Army, and 
an administrative member of the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) who worked for two 
years  with the Participating Police Forces 
(PPF) of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). He has been 
published in the areas of medical ethics and 
of military ethics.
The Revd Charles Brown Beu is a Solomon 
Islander, with degrees in Theology. After he 
was ordained as an Anglican Priest he served 
as a Member of the Parliament of Solomon 
Islands (1991 to 1998) and was a Minister 
in the government of Solomon Mamaloni 
(1995 to 1998). After leaving politics he 
returned to ministry in the Anglican Church 
of Melanesia.
ENDNOtES
In the experience of the authors, Australian 1. 
government officials at lower levels 
often (but not always) show a baffling 
insensitivity to the role of religion or lotu. 
On one occasion Dr Joseph was asked 
by a RAMSI official organizing a public 
Christmas Carol concert if it was a good 
idea to include prayers – to the average 
Solomon Islander it would have been 
incomprehensible not to have prayers on 
such an occasion.
Of the twenty-three members of the 2. 
Constitutional Committee, one was a 
clergyman (the Anglican Archbishop of 
Melanesia) representing the Solomon 
Islands Christian Association. Eight 
organisations made written submissions, 
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including the Christian Fellowship Church 
and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
(Appendix 3 of the report); presumably 
the other churches felt that their interests 
were adequately represented by the 
Archbishop. There are no significant 
references in the Report to religion; it is a 
thoroughly secular document.
A limited exception to this was where 3. 
services were suspended due to action 
by militants, or fear of action by militants. 
For example, Selwyn College and the 
Bishop Patteson Theological College, 
both of which are in rural north-west 
Guadalcanal, suspended their classes 
for the second half of 2000, resuming 
the following year. However, in this and 
similar cases the cause for disruption to 
services was not inability by the churches 
to deliver the services, but intervention by 
external actors.
One side effect of this since the tension 4. 
have been attempts by cash-strapped 
provincial governments to hand back 
schools to the churches, and a willingness 
of churches to take them, for reasons 
including concerns about declining moral 
standards. In particular, fifty schools were 
handed back to UCSI in 2005 (Bird 2007, 
11) – one imagines that a similar event in 
Australia would provoke condemnation 
rather than congratulations.
The most renowned literal instance of 5. 
the Brothers being in ‘no-mans land’ was 
when the Tasiu camped on the bridge at 
Alligator Creek between the MEF and IFM 
positions.
Ronnie Cawa and others were 6. 
subsequently imprisoned for life for these 
murders, in October 2005.
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0711/7. 
S00838.htm
There has been a significant movement 8. 
of people in and out of Honiara since the 
last census, but at a rough estimate about 
65,000 people (or 15% of the population) 
either live permanently or temporarily in 
Honiara, 5% are in other urban centres 
such as Gizo and Auki, and 80% still live 
in small villages.
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